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	A truism of theatre and performance studies is that theatre, while concerned with aesthetics and, so, with art forms, is an active doing, a practice through and through.  What the discipline has failed to recognise adequately, however – and this despite the work of sociologists of the theatre – is that theatre practice is not solely a matter of acquiring skills, developing craftsmanship and realising the latter effectively in the making of pieces of theatre.  This cumulative process of training, research, creation, rehearsal, presentation (or rejection thereof in laboratory conditions) together with repetition and continuity is ‘practice’ in the most basic sense of the term.  Yet theatre practice, regardless of its technical-artistic specificity, is, at the same time, a social practice, and it is necessarily social for several reasons.  To start with, it relies for its very execution on plural forces.  It is not, in other words, the exercise of a single will, no matter how gifted, exceptional and inspired or inspiring this or that individual doing theatre may be.​[1]​
	The first principle, then, that makes theatre a social practice is its collective agency, based on a dialogical relationship, which is dialogical across the numbers of people involved, as in a network, in any given time, space and place.  Performers and directors, choreographers, co-ordinators or project leaders come together with designers, composers, musicians, technicians and other collaborators to make something, usually with the intention of engaging spectators in that ‘something’ emerging from their work.  These are group-made performances of whatever denomination, depending on their makers’ conception and perception of generic categories – thus ‘devising’, say, or ‘dance’, or ‘text-based interpretation’, or ‘participatory’, or ‘interactive’ performance, where the spectator largely determines the performance, sometimes in a one-on-one, intimate encounter with the performer-initiator.​[2]​  But there are, as well, varieties of solo performance, including ‘performance art’ or ‘body art’, this genre having been considerably shaped by women using such non-theatre-dedicated spaces as art galleries, clubs, ordinary rooms, and so forth.  Among them are Marina Abramovic, Carolee Schneeman, and Orlan, naming only a few of the well-known pioneers.  The notion of agency called upon here, whether agency is collective or singular, implies not only the exercise of will referred to earlier, but also a consciously assumed motivation and desire to fulfil the task at hand.  By the same token, it suggests that the ‘doers’, who are agents of action, have a degree of freedom and choice in their actions, notwithstanding the rules, regulations and norms of societies. 
	These agents are human beings – in the phrase of everyday rather than sociological language.   Yet it is vital to benefit from sociological thought and observe that human beings are social by the very fact of their living and working in groupings to which the word ‘society’ still pertains.  ‘Society’ has not yet become an irrelevant point of reference, regardless of the fact that contemporary social structures are increasingly unstable, whether primarily for economic and political reasons (witness the current world recession), for reasons to do with globalisation (hence the alleged disintegration of national communities) or because of those ideological and cultural pressures that favour entities smaller than the state (or fiefdom) in the name of groupings by religion or ethnicity.  In whichever way a society is identified, its social character is derived from the relational character of the beings who constitute it. In other words, the ‘I’ of one can be defined only in relation to the ‘I’ of another, who is also a ‘You’.  
	 Relational cohesiveness of this type is the very ‘glue’ of theatre practice, besides being indispensible for that especially pronounced mode of social interaction known as ensemble theatre.  The ensemble, as invented by Konstantin Stanislavsky and Vladimir Nemirovich-Danchenko for the Moscow Art Theatre, subsequently found numerous variations, going from the repertory theatres of the twentieth century to the core-group model of a Peter Brook in France and, in England, to the temporary, quasi project-based ‘ensemble’ cultivated by Declan Donnellan for Cheek by Jowl in the 2000s, and, differently, to the ‘ensemble’ pursued by Katie Mitchell through the continuity not so much of her actors (difficult to achieve in Britain) as of her production team; and going sideways (since no development moves in a straight line) to the small-scale ensembles focusing on the actor’s presence rather than characterisation, where cohesiveness is fostered by constant psychophysical proximity in play.  Take, for the latter instance, the Odin Teatret in Denmark, Song of the Goat and Teatr Zar in Poland, and Double Edge in the United States, within a myriad of examples of such groups currently working the world over, the initial inspiration of the ones cited coming, even when indirectly, from Jerzy Grotowski’s practice with the performers who became the Laboratory Theatre.  
	The sketch offered here is an international one, but it suggests, by its signposts, that one company’s relation to another, in terms of connections and differences, defines its uniqueness, as does, at the same time, its relational position in its own social context: thus, as a case in point, Teatr Zar in the social conditions and idiosyncrasies of Poland today. Questions to do with relation are not about historical lineage (this gave rise to this which gave rise to this) or aesthetic genealogy (this practitioner – or company – influenced x who influenced y to follow style z).  They concern place and placing in a bigger picture that assembles, however loosely, the theatres in all their diversity within a particular society and – when taking a broader picture still – the variety of theatres within an international perspective covering the same period of time.  One such question might ask whether a company was fully or partly established in its society, or carving out its niche, or struggling to claim a space at all. Another might be concerned with how a company’s local position was affected by its international exposure, impact and reputation.  Questions such as these are very much about relational attributes, and it is precisely theatre’s relational capacity within the dynamics of societies that gives the second principle identifying theatre as a social practice.	
	Group practice (which need not be ensemble driven), as distinct from solo practice may well require different analytical approaches.  Be this as it may, group- and solo-made works are quite different in their textures, which is inevitable since the former come from multiple contributions occurring simultaneously, while solo constructions depend for their layering on one input.  Even so, soloists may draw upon the advice or even direct intervention of others (the case of Orlan’s surgery, for example), and they certainly must draw on infrastructural support, not least that of gallery managers or owners, who hire out their spaces to performers.  Nor can the importance of infrastructural support for group work be ignored, since the operations of frameworks, all mobilised by agents who have their respective tasks, are integral to the institutions – organisational systems, buildings, performance venues – through which theatre practice of all kinds is channelled.  Its institutional dimension is the third principle that defines the theatre as a social practice. 
		There should be no misunderstanding. The institutions of the theatre are not confined to bricks and mortar, any more than they are to the enterprise of financiers and producers, on the one hand, and the activities of administrators, on the other.  They encompass, as well, the non-material aspects of social life, which anthropologists generally describe as ‘symbolic’ and which Pierre Bourdieu has specified as being, above all else, the realm of status and prestige.​[3]​ The characteristic of institutions is that they embody values, prejudices and learned and perpetuated evaluations as to what is ‘good’, ‘bad’ or ‘indifferent’, what is to be done or not (usually according to ‘accepted’ practice), and what is to be kept or discarded for the institutions’ endurance, whether in the shorter or longer term.  The Moscow Art Theatre, from its founding in 1897, quickly became an institution that embodied the values of ensemble work, respect for the work of the actor as creative work, respect for the work of colleagues, respect for the profession and, among other major innovations that distinguished this theatre from its predecessors, the idea that theatre was not a matter of posturing, ego-satisfaction, commercialism and market-centred entertainment but of an artistic, ethical and spiritual journey.   
	Social change brought about embodiment change, but despite its many vicissitudes in the course of historical and political trauma, notably during the 1930s until after Stalin’s death in 1953, groups in the MAT who had not been completely crushed, aspired to embody what had made it the institution it had been recognised to be in the first place. The stature that the MAT had gained in the first two decades of the twentieth century, above all from its artistic accomplishments, was instrumental in its status as an institution, which indicates just how fundamental theatre practice can be for the definition of an institution and the ‘symbolic power’ – assuming Bourdieu’s terminology – that it wields. 
	Embodiment does not happen by itself.  The social classes and groups who form, rule and run institutions imbue these institutions with their values, to which the people working in them conform, not necessarily because of personal investment, but functionally, impersonally; and these classes and groups imbue their establishments with the symbolic power they have asserted socially – which, Bourdieu argues, is not always allied to economic or political power – down, even, to how the bricks and mortar appear to the gaze  – solid or make-shift, elegant or shabby, ostentatious or whatever else the semiotic signal of value may.  In theatre practice, the values of those in charge promote not only familiarity with that practice, but also a taste for it, as did, in the past, the MAT for psychological realism, and as do, in the present, Punchdrunk in London, for instance, for quirky, immersive spectacle in found spaces, and Toneelgroep in Amsterdam for intricate interplay between live actors and multi-media.
	Taste is a complex phenomenon, and, in Bourdieu’s theory, the classes and class fractions at the top of the social hierarchy promote their version of it in order both to impose and to maintain their social position.  In this way, they use ‘cultural capital’ to acquire ‘distinction’ (how one social group or class distinguishes its cultural habits and predispositions, which constitute ‘taste’, from another).  Similarly, they use this capital to ‘consecrate’, in Bourdieu’s words, identified artistic practices and ‘legitimate’ them for the rest of their society’s citizens.​[4]​  As a consequence – to bring this discussion to the theatre (which Bourdieu does not do) – taste for this or that theatre comes from above.   However, what is crucially missing from Bourdieu’s argument is any sense of how practitioners – in this discussion, theatre practitioners – nurture taste through their very practice, educating, one might say, their audiences, not least their social- elite audiences, to grasp that practice and give it its due.​[5]​  Furthermore, Bourdieu fails to consider how artists (his generic term) help to form audiences that are not part of the social elites; and, while he maintains that elites are multiple and different in kind – intellectual elites are not necessarily economic elites, for example – he underestimates what might be called the capacity for discernment not only of intellectual elites (they are not always subservient to money or political power), but also of the artists – theatre practitioners – themselves.  This capacity for discernment is a channel for subjective and something like ‘free’ assessment – as ‘free’ as the obligations, strictures and stresses of class-and group structures can allow.  
	Theatre practitioners have their own sub-groups – the well-born, wealthy, established and prestigious practitioners, by contrast with their opposite, who struggle on all levels; and then there are many between these extremes.  However, the value, they accord to exercising their art, craft and imagination powers them, enabling them to believe and evaluate positively what they do, and how and why they do it.  The ‘Why?’ of it is not automatically aligned with a search for cultural and social distinction (or consecration, or legitimation), even though societies secrete inequalities. This ‘Why? has to do, in some measure, with commitment to, and conviction in, a designated practice. Then there is the sheer pleasure of doing it.  On a symbolic level, pride in this practice is a potent element. Again, Bourdieu is so single-mindedly focused on the mechanisms at play in a given field of practice – galleries/journals that promote some painters/writers at the expense of others, among many instrumentalist factors – that he casts aside the desire of artists to further their art by exploring, inventing and enjoying it.​[6]​ 
	Where theatre is concerned, practice has immediate effect.  Its practitioners exercise their art and craft in relation to spectators, who, if generally members of fractions of the middle classes (unless working-class spectators are especially targeted) are indispensible for the act of theatre to occur.​[7]​  The collective event that is a performance relies, then, on the collectivity of spectators who interact with it. These spectators are as diverse as the social groups from which they come by age, gender, formal education, occupation, salary, and so on, and they all bring their distinctive social standing, experience and outlook with them.  At the same time, they bring their exposure and access to previous theatre events, as well as empathetic understanding of them, all this building up their capacity for discernment, that is, distinguishing between a and b, not simply intellectually, but with their nerves and heart.  Here, in this interchange and ‘buzz’ between spectators and performers, lies the fourth principle that makes theatre a social practice. 
	The fifth principle is social context (referred to already), and it is ubiquitous and all-pervasive, absorbing as well as absorbed by theatre makers, spectators, performances, institutions, governments, and anything else that composes a particular society in historical time.  However, for all its chronotopic significance (time-space-place), the idea of social context is not obliged to be totally restricted to national-geographic boundaries, to this particular society in this particular location. The idea needs to be flexible because the local-global nexus is of paramount importance in contemporary societies.  Few societies in the contemporary world are immune to global interconnectivity, not only because of the economic networks that bind them in relations of interdependency, but also because of the sociocultural influences that they exert upon each other.  The subject of research together with the questions posed by the researcher generally indicate the parameters of ‘social context’ and how elastic they may be, whether they need to extended to the ‘global’ or to be confined to the ’local’.  In any case, these terms acquire definition from the aspect(s) of theatre/performance selected for research, and the material shows how far it has to be contexualised to make the greatest sense.
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